Usually the common vulnerability is a combination of Outlook and Active Directory. Outlook will happily execute whatever users click upon and AD lets them steal their credentials, to simplify things.
Encryption alone won’t prevent ransomware to encrypt it again. The original files need to be readable after all, so they are either unencrypted at boot or appear unencrypted to the (infected) client by machine/session key management. Nevertheless, adding an addittional, "“hostile” encryption layer will make them unreadable. The reasonable thing would be not to use a monocultural, standard setup that is known to be vulnerable to that kind of attack and first of all to get rid of fucking Outlook which has always been a dumpster fire.
Let me assure you that the original board that was voting for Open Office’s proposal was absolutely pissed off, short of dissolving but eventually unable to revert the decision because of it’s formal correctness.
…and bribed the represenatives of the “new” IETF members as well as their governments to vote for Microsoft’s standard. The latter was, of course, a matter strictly between “business partners” and probably barred behind NDAs, so “legal” as long as nobody would blow the wistle.
“bribed” is a gross simplifiction of the almost hilariously evil plot they pulled to get OOXML certified. They actually bribed a couple of smaller nation states to become IETF members and vote for Microsoft’s standard. It was a major scandal back in the day but formally legal.
4·4 days ago
Usually the common vulnerability is a combination of Outlook and Active Directory. Outlook will happily execute whatever users click upon and AD lets them steal their credentials, to simplify things.